For the majority of you that do not know me, I have spent all of my life living between France, Germany and the United States. As a political science major at HC and a daily reader of political news, the effect of public opinion and demographic shifts on electoral agendas has always fascinated me.
Recently, two events occurred which exemplify a phenomenon that has slowly moved political majorities in large western economies: Brexit and the election of Thomas Kemmerich. Kemmerich, a FDP (neoliberal) Minister-President of East German State Thuringia won parliamentary votes of the CDU (Christian Democrats) and far right (some call them Neo-Nazi, Alternative für Deutschland Party -AfD), causing a major political turmoil within Germany’s political class and ultimately leading to Kemmerich’s resignation.
While these events are seemingly disconnected, they characterize internal ideological conflicts mainstream political parties have been facing in the last 40 years and offer different strategic choices these parties have made to capture votes of an increasingly fractured and radicalized voter base.
In this short piece, I will share my understanding of how and why European political parties have lost significant chunks of their electoral base to far-right political parties and have adjusted their electoral strategies to survive, tacitly agreeing with their anti-immigration, populist agenda, collaborating with these factions or slowly facing the risk of disappearing.
Since the fall of the Berlin wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, mainstream European political parties have offered the following similar choices to voters: a social democratic state on the left in which market capitalism is embraced but softened by generous social benefits, and, on the right, a freer, more laissez-faire form of market economy in which the government operates as a regulator but still allows for a generous safety net. Regarding immigration issues, the left has tended to embrace borders that are more open while the right has favored a slightly more conservative, nationalist stand.
In Europe’s major western economies, political parties have divided the electoral cake and agreed on three ideas: social democracy, the free movement of goods and people and the construction of a supra national political organization, the European Union. They built their agenda, electoral pitch and policies around these fundamental pillars. Over time, however, several factors, which correlated to these policies, have hollowed-out their electoral base. De-industrialization, unemployment and immigration, have slowly pushed voters to retreat, abstain, or join the ranks of more extreme or alternative political movements whose messages focus on national identity and protectionist economic policies, but also “green” agendas.
The UK, France and Germany have all witnessed this shift at different times and in different forms. During that shift, far-right political movements remained at the fringe of mainstream political discourse, oftentimes demonized and excluded of any alliances or coalitions.
To survive this electoral shift, however, mainstream parties, especially those on the right, are increasingly tempted to poach on the hunting grounds of the far right. In certain circumstances, Brexit and Thüringen, as recent prime examples, have openly benefited from their votes. Observers are wondering what the future of center-right parties will become and if far-right political ideas and parties will increasingly be accepted and perhaps even become necessary allies in coalition building.
Until recently, it would have been unthinkable for mainstream traditional center-right parties to benefit from passive or active support of far-right political support; The memory of the 1930s dictatorships in Spain, Germany, and Italy often acted as a scarecrow to any party suggesting a policy that left-wing opponents could be characterized as xenophobic, racist or fascist.
Political Scientist Eric Kauffman brilliantly describes this in his book “White Shift,” showing how mainstream political parties refused to address the ideological demands of a growing chunk of the population frustrated by immigration (but not only), thus leading to the growth of so-called populist parties catering to these demands.
In this context, Germany, France and the UK, while completely different battlegrounds, are interesting examples to consider as right-wing movements shape the political agenda.
In France, nationalist anti-immigration party Front National (now renamed Rassemblement National), had been hoovering around 10-15% of votes until its founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, made it to the second round of presidential elections in 2002. Since 2011, his daughter Marine has taken the party’s leadership, softened its image and has repeatedly gained second or third place in national elections, even earning 33.9 % of the vote in the recent 2017 elections in which Emmanuel Macron took everyone by surprise by running on an independent, centrist platform. Marine Le Pen’s popularity rises with concerns over immigration and has drained supporters from the traditional center-right parties (as well as the former Communist party interestingly), leaving observers to wonder how the center right’s electoral strategy will evolve to compensate for the loss of popular support.
Germany, due to its federal organization and electoral system offers a different picture. Its post-war constitution and political system were designed to prevent the ruse of extremist parties, favoring a strong, two-party system, much more similar/very similar to the one found in the United States but with a frequent occurrence of coalition governments. While new parties have emerged, such as the neoliberal FDP or the Greens, the biggest political challenge to the two-party system was brought upon by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to welcome over 1 million refugees, mostly stemming from Muslim countries. This unilateral decision by the Chancellor led to the shattering entry into national parliament of the AfD in 2017.
The United Kingdom went through a different situation altogether. In a way, political decisions leading to Brexit – the 2016 referendum – were strategic yet hazardous moves by the Cameron government which none of its major European ideological relatives would have considered. The referendum clearly pandered to the anxieties of the right-wing populist Eurosceptic UKIP supporters and led to the surprising Brexit outcome, which materialized February 1, 2020 after nearly 4 years of negotiation.
Going forward, in the hope that Europe and the global economy recovers quickly from the Covid-19 pandemic, the renewed spike in refugee arrivals at Europe’s gates brought on by Turkey’s aggressive diplomacy might strengthen the fear-narrative peddled by right wing parties and further weaken center-right parties unable or unwilling to cater to that voter-demographic.
With this in mind, the role of Germany and the Franco-German relationship will be key in the development of the European agenda in the coming months. French president Macron had already offered his vision for a more integrated and independent Europe in a famous speech held in Aachen, Germany in 2019. As expected, the fiscally conservative German political class received the speech with lukewarm enthusiasm.
Upcoming national elections in member and non-EU member countries could very well be the platform in which the questions tied to national identity and immigration might be discussed openly and might just be the opportunity for mainstream political parties to reclaim their electorate from the less experienced and oftentimes irresponsible right-wing political groupings and agitators.